University of Dayton Law Review
Volume 35
Number 1 Symposium — The Fall from the
Bailout

Article 8

10-1-2009

Disclosure and Judgment: "We Have Met Madoff and He Is Ours"
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw
Suffolk University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Lipshaw, Jeffrey M. (2009) "Disclosure and Judgment: "We Have Met Madoff and He Is Ours"," University
of Dayton Law Review: Vol. 35: No. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol35/iss1/8

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in University of Dayton Law Review by an authorized editor of eCommons. For more
information, please contact mschlangen1@udayton.edu, ecommons@udayton.edu.

DISCLOSURE AND JUDGMENT: “WE HAVE MET
MADOFF AND HE IS OURS”
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw

*

I have had money managers and investment advisers counseling me
since my wife and I, thirty years ago, first opened one of those innovative
Cash Management Accounts at Merrill Lynch. The young fellow who was
recommending certificates of deposit to protect our first $20,000 (later our
down payment on a house) is now a seasoned executive, and he has done a
pretty good job along the way. We saved a few dollars over the course of a
career, and another money manager did a nice job diversifying us away from
the bursting of the Internet bubble earlier in this decade. Here is an example
of the good advice. One of the hot stocks of that bubble was Qualcomm—it
was what Peter Lynch called a “twenty-banger”; shares we bought at $28
were trading for $560. As the stock approached $600 per share, and was
coming to dominate our portfolio, the question was what to do. Pundits
were saying, “buy”; this was easily going to be a $1,000 stock. Shortly
thereafter it did a four-for-one split, the bubble burst, and it never again
approached the equivalent of $600 per share. I was a pretty sophisticated
fellow, but I loved that stock. What I had never heard of, however, was the
idea of re-balancing the portfolio. If I was smart about anything, it was that
when my advisor said we need to sell a good chunk of the Qualcomm to
rebalance, I resisted for a little bit, and then said to myself, “Wait a minute,
what am I paying him for, if not exactly this kind of judgment?” What was
the difference between saying that about my advisor and someone else
saying it about Bernie Madoff, other than dumb luck?
It turns out mine was good judgment, but that is not my point. My
scholarly project is not nearly as much about the specifics of regulation,
whether by the SEC or others, as about judgment and its irreducibility. I
feel eminently unqualified to expound on the silver bullets that are the key
to solving systemic problems, perhaps because my intuition is that there are
either no silver bullets, or so many that the silver is not worth very much.
This crisis is, like all disasters seen in retrospect, the confluence of a number
of things at just the right time—an economic Bridge of San Luis Rey, as it
*
Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School. A.B., University of Michigan; J.D.,
Stanford University. This essay was the basis of my presentation at a symposium entitled "The Fallout
from the Bailout," held at the University of Dayton Law School on March 20, 2009. As to the title,
consider it a tribute to Walt Kelly and Pogo ("we have met the enemy and he is us"), crossed with a
reference to William Henry Harrison's original message in the War of 1812 ("we have met the enemy and
they are ours"). The question is: By what grace of God were many of us fortunate enough not to have
relied on a Madoff or Stanford or somebody like them?
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were.1 Lots of money in the system, loose standards for credit ratings,2
undue faith (or hubris) in the science of financial models,3 and the usual
psychology of bubbles took greed and fear out of the appropriate
equilibrium. Now we are dealing with the fear side of the polarity.
Being pathologically fearful of pontificating about systemic
solutions,4 I am more interested in looking at the system from the inside out,
or more precisely, at the point at which the objective data the system
presents interfaces with individual minds that have to process the data. My
thesis is that more information, more data, more disclosure of the kind
traditionally mandated by the SEC is good, but at the end, somebody makes
a judgment about what to infer from the data. The only real question is the
number of proxies and heuristics that intervene between the decision-maker
and the data. The consequence is that, unless we are prepared to make a
fundamental move from disclosure-based regulation to merit regulation, we
can tweak around the edges with improvements to the SEC’s oversight, but
nothing is going to substitute for human beings making sound judgments
about the information that has been disclosed to them.
How do today’s collateralized debt obligations fit within the
securities regulation system? Following the Choi and Pritchard casebook,5 I
start my course on securities regulation with a series of hypotheticals that
establish the parameters of markets for information, and then the kinds of
regulation that might be appropriate. I observe that one may sell or buy a
computer or a calculator or bicycle or book or candy bar without a whole lot
of obvious regulation or interference from the government, and ask the
question: Why are investment securities so special? We distinguish between
three different kinds of regulation. Merit regulation actually regulates the
1

See generally THORNTON WILDER, THE BRIDGE OF SAN LUIS REY (1928).
See Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis: A User Fee Approach for
Rating Agency Accountability, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011, 1044 (2009).
3
Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, at 25; see also NASSIM
NICHOLAS TALEB, FOOLED BY RANDOMNESS (2d ed., Random House 2005) (2004).
4
For the views of someone far more competent than I to expound upon the systemic issues, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193 (2008). Professor Schwarcz defines systemic risk
as
the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure
triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets
or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii)
resulting in increases in the cost of capital or decreases in its availability, often
evidenced by substantial financial-market price volatility.
2

Id. at 204. Note that he is equally skeptical of disclosure for the control of systemic risk because
the nature of systemic risk is that market participants, operating in their own interests do not perceive it;
moreover, “investors and counterparties already demand, and usually receive, disclosure to the extent it
helps them assess the merits of their investments, qua investments.” Id. at 218. Not surprisingly, then, he
does not see much of a role for securities regulation on the systemic side of things. Id. at 212. My focus
here is on the more traditional role of securities regulation in eliminating information asymmetries.
5
See STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 22-31
(2d ed. 2008).
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substance of the product. It would bar the use of trans fats in Big Macs or
Whoppers. Disclosure regulation would not dictate whether the trans fats
could or could not be used, but it will make sure that you know when you
buy the burger just how much trans fat you are going to be consuming, and
perhaps even some information about the risks and dangers of trans fat.
Consumer education is a little like disclosure regulation, but the idea is not
to do anything to the product or even disclose about specific products, but
educate people about trans fats so they themselves demand the information
and make their own decisions.
From the enactment of the two primary securities acts in the New
Deal, the primary focus of securities regulation about the securities
themselves has been disclosure. There is also a great deal of regulation of
the broker-dealer industry in the 1934 Act, but the primary goal of the
regulation is transparency of the broker-dealer’s role vis-à-vis the broker’s
role as agent or principal in the transactions. The competence of the broker
or investment adviser is still regulated by state law. Moreover, the format of
the disclosure in the regulatory system depends on whom the information is
about, to whom the information is being given, and the extent to which the
transactions are public or, in other words, broad distributions. We can say
generally at one end of the spectrum, a broad distribution of a new
company’s securities to the general public will require the full panoply of
disclosure, and rigorous control of the process by which that disclosure in
the form of a prospectus gets into the hands of the purchaser. At the other
end of the spectrum, there is a relatively laissez-faire approach to narrowly
focused offerings of well-known seasoned issuers (as they are called) to
sophisticated purchasers.
6

The drafters of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were not thinking about
complex collateralized debt obligations and their associated derivatives and
hedges, but let us focus for a moment on what those securities do, and why
disclosure regulation is still an appropriate method.7 There are two pieces to
the puzzle, and in my experience, no industries are as simple in concept, but
as complex in execution, as the ones for (a) securitizing pools of
collateralized financial instruments, and (b) instruments used as “credit
enhancements” or hedges which are derivative allocations of financial and
casualty risk on those pools.
6
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2006) (“the 1933 Act”); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (2006) (“the 1934 Act”).
7
See generally Asset-Backed Securities, 70 Fed. Reg. 1,506, 1,508 (Jan. 7, 2005) (noting that
"asset-backed securities and ABS issuers differ from corporate securities and operating companies. In
offering ABS, there is generally no business or management to describe. Instead, information about the
transaction structure and the characteristics and quality of the asset pool and servicing is often what is
most important to investors. Many of the Commission’s existing disclosure and reporting requirements,
which are designed primarily for corporate issuers and their securities, do not elicit relevant information
for most asset-backed securities transactions.”).
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First, perhaps the horse was already out of the barn when the SEC
adopted Regulation AB in 20058, setting forth what it claimed was largely
the codification of staff interpretations and existing disclosure practices
generated in the market for asset-backed securities. Yet there does not seem
to be any doubt that the SEC understood, as did the market participants, just
how complex the relatively simple concept had gotten in practice. The SEC
acknowledged that sophisticated institutions, not retail purchasers, were the
primary holders of asset-backed securities.9 It knew that the value of the
pooled securities depended not just on the creditworthiness of the individual
borrowers, but on the quality of the servicing at the level of those interacting
with individual borrowers.10 The slicing and dicing of the pools into
tranches was no secret. Nor was there any doubt about the role of the credit
rating agencies in evaluating the information. Finally, it was understood
that credit enhancements, like credit default swaps, were available for the
purpose of hedging risk.11 In short, the disclosure system existed by which
presumably rational and, indeed, sophisticated issuers and buyers could
understand what they were buying and selling. The question we will need to
address is why the availability of the information did not help.
Second, despite the patina or mystery, derivative instruments,
whether insurance contracts or currency futures, are not in themselves good
or bad, and, used well, are part of a sound strategy of giving up some of the
upside to insure against undue loss on the downside, assuming that the
insurer or the derivative counter-party is around and able to pay on the
contract. The reason the derivative industry is simple in concept is that it
goes back to algorithms law students learn in their first year contract law
class.12 The simple hypothetical demonstrating the measure of damages for
the contract for the future delivery of bushels of wheat is essentially an
algorithm for risk allocation. Assume Sam Seller contracts with Barbara
Buyer to sell her 100 bushels of wheat at a dollar per bushel ninety days
hence. The spot price over that period rises to $1.20 per bushel. The
formula embodied in the law of contract expectation damages tells us that
Barbara Buyer wins a right worth twenty cents. Conversely, if the price
falls to eighty cents a bushel, Sam Seller wins because of his right to force
Barbara Buyer to take the wheat at twenty cents above the market price.
That is a forward contract. In my little hypothetical, if the parties do
not really intend to deliver, the contract itself (not the underlying wheat) is a
futures contract, and on the delivery date worth about twenty cents less
transaction costs.13 In other words, the holder of the right should be able
8

Id. at 1,506.
Id. at 1,511.
10
Id. at 1,510-11.
11
Id. at 1,511.
12
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 125-26 (6th ed., 2003).
13
Id. at 126.
9
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that day to sell the contract to somebody for, say, up to nineteen cents a
bushel, because the buyer of the contract is still better off by a penny. The
irony here, of course, is that futures contracts have real value in being
conservative, which is why they are “hedges” as in hedging your bet.
Assume a U.S.-based company, which reports its earnings in dollars, sells a
widget in Europe with the price denominated in euros on March 1, and the
terms are that the buyer is to pay €1,000 in ninety days. At the moment, the
exchange rate is 1.5 U.S. dollars to the euro. If the company were interested
in making money on currency fluctuation as well as widgets, it could take its
chances. If the euro rises in value to 1.75 to the dollar, it can make some
money when it repatriates that cash. The company also, however, runs the
risk of having the euro fall. As to currency, however, the company is far
more interested in being safe than in making money. If it buys a ninety-day
futures contract on euros at the rate of 1.5 to the dollar, the company has
insurance against currency devaluation. Assume that on the ninetieth day,
the euro falls in relation to the dollar, and the company would bring home
only $1,200 rather than the $1,500 that it expected when it made the sale.
The company receives the buyer’s €1,000, fulfills its futures contract
obligation by buying the $1,500, and some counter-party loses a bet. The
company has lost the opportunity to profit if the euro went up in value, but it
is hedged against the downside.14
It is fair to say we do not want to ban this market. There are
currency traders who gamble on the changes of relative values of currencies,
and that is their business.15 We staid middle-American businesses in Dayton
and Elkhart and Moline and Omaha, however, can use them for our very
conservative and cautious purposes.16 While those gamblers may make or
lose money on dumb luck, there is nothing dumb or lucky about the
currency hedging strategy, as long as the counter-party to my contract is
around and has the dollars to deliver.17 By the way, generally accepted
accounting principles require that there be a linkage between my sales and
my future contracts or otherwise I have to disclose the extent to which I am
speculating in the currency markets.18 If it is appropriate to securitize
mortgage pools, then some form of derivative hedging in them is almost
14
Assume that the Euro increases in value relative to the dollar, say, to two to one. If there had
been no hedge, the company would be able to convert the €1,000 into $2,000, making $500 on currency
in addition to the $1,500 it expected in product revenue. But with the hedge in place, it needs to fulfill its
obligation to buy $1,500 for €1,000, rewarding a counterparty that guessed right. Effectively, the
company gives up the $500 of currency gain. There is a strategy as well to hedge by purchasing an
option, but that complication is not necessary for my point here.
15
See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 218.
16
René M. Stulz, In Defense of Derivatives and How to Regulate Them, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2009,
at A15.
17
See Schwarcz, supra note 4, at 220-22.
18
See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., SUMMARY OF STATEMENT 133, ACCOUNTING
FOR DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES (1998), http://www.fasb.org/st/summary/
stsum133.shtml.
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certainly appropriate as well.
I do not consider Warren Buffett a secular saint; I do, however,
appreciate the fact that I can understand what he is saying most of the time.
It is here I want to move from disclosure to judgment, because it seems to
me the systems to insure the former were in place, but that the latter broke
down in the current crisis. The global solution is therefore not more
disclosure (which is the SEC’s basic tool) but better judgment. Despite
Buffett’s well-known penchant for buying companies whose products he
understands—soft drinks, department stores, carpet companies19—Berkshire
Hathaway’s primary business is financial and casualty risk allocation.20 It is
founded in precisely the algorithms that flow from contracts; in no business
like insurance do contract words link to value. The question Buffett lays
before us, however, is how much we can rely on algorithms to do our
thinking for us, even in this most algorithmic of businesses.21
Before I get to Buffett’s concrete examples of the practice of
judgment, I want to touch on a subject dear to my heart: the theory of
judgment. This is not the place for my full exegesis on all the aspects of
judgment, like moral judgment or the objective-subjective problem, or selfdeception; here I just want to focus on the narrow subject of judgment in
predicting the future, as in making judgments about risk and return. One
element of judgment is an objective assessment, based on what we know, of
what we think will happen. This, we would think, is hardly mysterious at
all. Science is all about coming up with theories and laws of the physical
world–of cause and effect—that we rely on without even thinking about it.
There is, however, a kernel of mystery. When we say “science,” we usually
think “formula” or “theorem” or “physical law.” The goal of science is to
continue to reduce events and processes to their most fundamental rules and
regularities.22 But even science involves judgment in the forming of
hypotheses. Of all the various rules and regularities, when we come up with
a hypothesis, we are choosing one—we are making a judgment, and that
part of science remains mysterious and irreducible.
Let’s unpack those two points.
Point A. The goal of science is to reduce events and processes to their most
fundamental rules and regularities.
Understanding something about the world means we have ordered
19

Buffett Says Many Stocks Still Overvalued. HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 28, 2001, at 4.
Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008), available at http://sec.gov/Archives/
edgar/data/1067983/000119312509042455/dex991.htm [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT].
21
Id.
22
Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Law’s Illusion: Scientific Jurisprudence and the Struggle with Judgment 9,
(Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Res. Paper 08-20, 2008) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1163256 (discussing the philosophy of science).
20
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it. Ordering means that we have implied regularities. Regularities mean
that we have inferred a set of rules. “The sun will come up in the east every
morning.” “[My crazy dog] Annie will bark at a dog walking up the
street.”23 What we call “causation” is merely our repeated observation of
constant conjunction or regular sequence, leading to singular causal
statements that are general propositions asserting universal connections
between types of events. We say that one billiard ball causes another to
move in a certain way, but there is nothing except our repeated observations
that keeps us from thinking the ball will not just fly off the table and land at
Logan Airport. God does not cause airplanes to crash for a reason, nor does
God cause Captain Sullenberger to land safely in the Hudson River.
Point B. But even science involves judgment in the forming of hypotheses.
Of all the various rules and regularities, when we come up with a
hypothesis, we are choosing one—we are making a judgment, and that part
of science remains mysterious and irreducible.
So science is the process of developing rules, regressions, and
regularities. What is the mark of a good scientific theory? It is predictive.
We have done such a good job in observing regularities that we can make
good predictions about what will happen in the future.
How do we develop a theory? We have to start with a hypothesis.
But where does the hypothesis come from? A hypothesis is a guess, albeit
educated, about whether indeed there is some regularity in the data. But
there is no rule or regularity that tells us how to develop a hypothesis. We
know a hypothesis should be conservative, modest, simple, general, and
refutable. But it is a leap, and that leap is the judgment. That is, somehow I
have managed to see a pattern in the data, and my judgment is that the
pattern is significant enough to spend time testing it. The pattern at which
I'm guessing as a hypothesis may turn into a theory or a scientific law.
Even in science, there is judgment that precedes rules. Looking
backward, we take a mass of observed experience and think there may be
regularity in that experience. But if judgment precedes these rules, what are
the rules for judgment? Well, that is the key problem. There are no rules
for judgment. A rule for judgment would mean that there is a rule for
determining whether a particular experience fits a rule. But applying that
rule would in turn require judgment. If there were a rule for that judgment,
it would again require judgment to determine whether it applied. It is an
infinite regress.
Put another way, suppose we have decided that the rules for
hypotheses are that they be conservative, modest, simple, general, and
23
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refutable. Well, that is a hypothesis about hypotheses. What is the rule for
coming up about hypotheses about hypotheses? Do those have to be
conservative, etc.? It is irreducible because we are in a loop. In other
words, we have to take a mental leap at some point that is not defined by
another rule. In Potter Stewart terms, we cannot define it, even though we
know it when we see it.24
I now return to the somewhat provocative sub-title of this talk: “we
have met Madoff and he is ours.” At some point in the chain, somebody is
making a leap of judgment. In my investment portfolio, I am actually
relying on leaps all the way down. I rely on my account executive’s
judgment to select fund managers; my account executive relies on the
managers' judgment in picking stocks; the managers rely on CEOs and
CFOs who run the companies and so on. Any time someone tells you they
have the algorithm, like Economic Value Added,25 or Value at Risk,26 that is
the time to check your wallet and count your fingers. The heuristics of
relying on Bernie Madoff or Robert Allen Stanford were simply the most
recent and egregious examples of faith in another’s judgment gone very
much awry; there but for the grace of God go all of us who rely on the
judgments of our financial advisers, doctors, lawyers, civil engineers, and
auto mechanics. If we really think about the necessity of judgment
somewhere in the system upon which we base our investment decisions, we
are fortunate not to have to say, “we have met Madoff and he is ours.”
This is not to say there is no science left, nor that science has been
discredited. It is only to say that scientism in many things, law among them,
is one of the more interesting leaps of faith of the last century. Let us look
at Buffett’s letter to the Berkshire Hathaway shareholders in the 2008 annual
report,27 and the extent to which it focuses on diligence in addition to
disclosure, and judgment in addition to algorithm. I want to focus on two
pieces of data, because they have a common theme.
First, it is no secret that insurance companies are investment
vehicles that are, in addition, required to pay casualty losses. In other
words, most insurance companies lose money on the actual underwriting
(the claims and claims servicing would exceed the amount of the premium),
but make their profit on investment of the “float,” i.e., the premium dollars
they take in and hold for future payment of claims. In 2008, Berkshire
Hathaway’s insurance business reported an underwriting gain for the sixth
consecutive year.28 In simple terms, underwriting judgment is the process of
looking at the information about the potential insured, and making a
24

See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
G. BENNETT STEWART, III, THE QUEST FOR VALUE 136-38 (1991).
26
See Nocera, supra note 3; see also TALEB, supra note 3, at 289.
27
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
28
Id. at 4.
25
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decision whether the company will place a bet. There is no doubt that great
underwriters use heuristics, but at some point, it boils down to a judgment
call. Moreover, reserving for claims, both incurred and what is known as
IBNR (incurred but not reported), involves judgment.29 One significant
cause of insurance company insolvency is the chronic under-reserving for
claims.30
Second, Berkshire Hathaway’s entrant in the residential home
industry is Clayton Homes, the largest manufactured home builder in the
country.31 It has a financing arm.32 Clayton’s borrowers have a median
FICO score of 644, compared to a national median of 723, and about 35%
are below 620, the threshold for “subprime” borrowers.33 Yet “no purchaser
of the mortgages it originated and then securitized has ever lost a dime of
principal or interest.”34 The question is why, when others in the industry
have had “staggering losses.”35 Buffett’s explanation turns on judgment, not
disclosure.
The answer is elementary, going right back to Lending 101.
Our borrowers simply looked at how full-bore mortgage
payments would compare with their actual--not hoped-for-income and then decided whether they could live with that
commitment. Simply put, they took out a mortgage with
the intention of paying it off, whatever the course of home
prices.
Just as important is what our borrowers did not do. They
did not count on making their loan payments by refinancing.
They did not sign up for “teaser” rates that upon reset were
outsized relative to their income. And they did not assume
that they could always sell their home at a profit if their
mortgage payments became onerous.36
While Buffett credits the borrowers, my intuition is that potential
homebuyers walking into Clayton Homes are just as representative of the
subprime population as any other group of borrowers. Underwriting
mortgages, in the sense of deciding to whom you are going to lend, is just as
much a matter of judgment as deciding whom to insure. Indeed, careful
underwriting is precisely what responsible independent mortgage originators
29

Id. at 45.
See CHARLES A. MCALEAR, THE FOUNDERING ARK: INSURANCE ON THE ROCKS 72 (1984).
31
Warren E. Buffett, ‘Our Country Has Faced Far Worse Travails:’ A Paralyzing Fear Has
Engulfed the Country. But America’s Best Days Lie Ahead., NEWSWEEK, Mar. 9, 2009, at 42
[hereinafter Buffett].
32
ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
33
Id.
34
Buffett, supra note 31, at 42.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 42-43.
30
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and purchasers do. Without getting into a blame game as between the
lenders and the borrowers, I will suggest that the “least-cost avoider,” in
Coaseian terms, is the lender. Buffett's coda is that
[t]he present housing debacle should teach home buyers,
lenders, brokers and government some simple lessons that
will insure stability in the future. Home purchases should
involve an honest-to-God down payment of at least 10%
and monthly payments that can be comfortably handled by
the borrower’s income. That income should be carefully
verified.37
I was taught some years ago that some problems are only capable of
being managed, not solved.38 Those are situations in which we need
mutually dependent but polar opposite values to operate effectively. We see
these in business all the time—teamwork versus individual initiative,
centralization versus decentralization, hierarchy versus participation. Each
polar value has positive and negative consequences attached to it.
Organizations (or societies) adopt policies reflecting one polar value
because of the positives, and find over time that the negatives kick in. So
the move is to the positives of the other pole. Disclosure and judgment are
just such a polar continuum. To paraphrase Kant, judgment without
information is empty; information without judgment is blind.39 Information
without judgment gives us bubbles; judgment without information leaves us
at the mercy of Madoffs.

37

Id. at 43.
See generally BARRY JOHNSON, POLARITY MANAGEMENT: IDENTIFYING AND MANAGING
UNSOLVABLE PROBLEMS (1992).
39
IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 193-94 (Paul Guyer & Allen Wood trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781).
38
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